Tyree Lawson v. Brenda Haupt by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-17-2017 
Tyree Lawson v. Brenda Haupt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Tyree Lawson v. Brenda Haupt" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 175. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/175 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-128 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 16-4121 
___________ 
TYREE LAWSON, 
Appellant 
v. 
BRENDA HAUPT, SUED IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
____________________________________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00141) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter, Magistrate Judge 
____________________________________ 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 9, 2017 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: February 17, 2017) 
OPINION*
PER CURIAM 
Tyree Lawson appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania.  We will summarily affirm. 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In June 2015, Lawson, a prisoner confined at SCI-Forest, filed a complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Brenda Haupt, SCI-Forest Corrections Unit 
Manager, retaliated against him after he exercised his First Amendment right to file a 
grievance.  Specifically, Lawson claims that Haupt moved him from I Unit “privileged” 
housing to F Unit on December 4, 2014, in retaliation for his filing a grievance appeal.  
Lawson claims that F Unit is a “problematic” unit, and that he was also assigned to a cell 
with a “problematic” inmate. 
 In February and March 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  By order entered on September 28, 2016, the District Court1 granted Haupt’s 
motion for summary judgment, and denied Lawson’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  The District Court denied Lawson’s motion for reconsideration.  Lawson 
appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Lawson has been 
granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for 
possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   We may summarily affirm 
under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 if the appeal lacks substantial merit.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court order for summary judgment.  Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party “bears 
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
                                              
1 Both parties consented to a Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction over this matter. 
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identifying those portions” of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the 
moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party then must present specific facts that 
show there is a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).   
 We agree with the District Court that summary judgment was proper with regard 
to Lawson’s retaliation claim against Haupt.  To establish a claim of retaliation, a 
prisoner must show: (1) that he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) 
that he “suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of the prison officials”; and (3) that 
the protected activity was “a substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ 
decision to take the adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001).  
The burden then shifts to the prison officials to prove “that they would have made the 
same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.”  Id. at 334. 
 Lawson satisfied the first prong of a prima facie First Amendment retaliation 
claim by filing his grievance.  With regard to the second factor, we agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that Lawson has not established that he suffered the requisite adverse 
action.  While Lawson insists that I Unit is an “honor” or “privileged” housing unit and 
when Haupt transferred him, it constituted an adverse action, he has failed to demonstrate 
what additional benefits or privileges the I Unit offers that the other housing units lack.  
Moreover, it is well-established that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to any 
particular housing assignment.  See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1983). 
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 Lawson also fails to allege any causal connection between the filing of his 
grievance and his transfer to F Unit.  By contrast, Haupt produced evidence 
demonstrating that she would have transferred Lawson out of I Unit, even if he had not 
engaged in a constitutional protected activity.  In her summary judgment affidavit, Haupt 
stated that I Unit houses inmates who are eligible for outside clearance (R clearance), and 
others who, based on institutional need, are appropriate for level two housing – including 
maintenance workers, certain dietary workers, and commissary workers.  As outside 
clearance-eligible inmates are identified and moved into I Unit, those who do not require 
I Unit housing are moved out to make bed space available.  Lawson did not have an R 
code clearance and was not eligible for any of the jobs that would require placement in I 
Unit.  Haupt stated that on December 4, 2014, five incoming inmates were either R code 
or had job categories that required I Unit housing, and the unit was at near full capacity.  
As a result, Haupt moved Lawson and two other inmates from the unit.2  Moreover, 
Haupt contends that she has nothing to do with where transferred prisoners are placed in 
general population as the Inmate Employment Office handles all housing and bed 
assignments from that point, and she is not even told where the inmates are going.  
Lawson has not countered Haupt’s statements by presenting facts that would create a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  After considering the evidence of record, a reasonable 
finder of fact would have to conclude that Haupt would have made the same decision to 
                                              
2 Haupt stated that Lawson and several of the others who had been transferred out of I 
Unit had probably been placed there months earlier “because there was extra space at the 
time and no one gave the situation sufficient thought,” but Lawson “probably should 
never have been housed there in the first place.” 
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transfer Lawson out of legitimate penological interests regardless of any retaliatory 
motive.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  Thus, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment to Haupt.3 
 As there is no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
3 We further agree with the District Court’s determination that allowing Lawson the 
opportunity to amend his complaint to more fully allege adverse action would be futile as 
Haupt has established that she would have transferred Lawson absent his filing of the 
grievance or appeal. 
